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Legitimacy Building for the European 
Energy Exchange 
Sebastian Giacovelli  
Abstract: »Die Gewinnung von Legitimität für die European Energy Exchan-
ge«. This paper analyzes the strategies to build legitimacy for the European 
Energy Exchange in Leipzig (short: EEX) which became the central trading 
place for electricity in Germany in 2002. Following Suchman’s differentiation 
in the three phases of gaining, maintaining and repairing legitimacy, it focuses 
on the phase of gaining legitimacy. The arguments in this article are predomi-
nately based on neo-institutional sociology. They are part of a larger project on 
the forms, functions and consequences of price building at the EEX. 
Keywords: legitimacy, strategy, electricity, market, exchange. 
Introduction 
As late as in 1990, the “Vereinigung deutscher Elektrizitätswerke” (the Federa-
tion of German Power Plants), maintained “that electricity is not a commodity 
like other commodities but a service for which – like the production of drinking 
water – there was no competition anywhere in the world” (Alber and Fritsche 
1991). Only eight years later, the liberalisation of the German electricity mar-
ket entered its first stage. And less than another two years later, electricity was 
traded as homogeneous asset at the exchange, just like copper, gold or sides of 
pork.  
While in a physical sense, of course, electricity remained the same, the trade 
in this commodity had changed dramatically in that period. No doubt, the 
statement from 1990 had something to do with the safeguarding of interest. If 
electricity is described as a heterogeneous service, the asset is bound to the 
respective suppliers, making it unique and incomparable to other electricity 
products. This is a common sales strategy for homogeneous commodities 
(Packard 1957). However, the brisk advance of the liberalisation of the electric-
ity market (for a critical assessment of the consequences of liberalisation, see 
Bontrup and Marquardt 2010, 67ff.) and the start of the exchange-based elec-
tricity trading in Germany in 2000 speak a different language. Now the type 
and quality of electricity could be determined, transforming electricity into a 
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good to be traded in organised global markets (Cieslarczyk and Pilgram 2006, 
633). 
In this paper, I will look at the question of how the initiators of the electric-
ity exchanges in Frankfurt and Leipzig succeeded in establishing the exchange-
based trade in Germany. The key term in this context is legitimacy. In what 
way have the EEX and the LPX, as institutional entrepreneurs, been able to 
shape their environment, acquire credentials and preserve them through time? 
For the electricity exchanges are not simply other actors in the electricity mar-
ket. They act as the baseline price barometers of the electricity market.  
My understanding of legitimacy for the purpose of this paper is informed by 
Marc Suchman (1995, 574) who defines legitimacy as “a generalized percep-
tion or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or ap-
propriate within some socially constructed systems of norms, values, beliefs, 
and definitions”. To this definition, Niklas Luhmann adds a decisive extension. 
According to Luhmann, legitimacy means “accepting, within certain tolerance 
limits, a generalized condition of decisions whose content is as yet undeter-
mined” (Luhmann 1983, 28). This makes legitimacy not a kind of voluntary 
acceptance but a communication process that restructures what is expected and 
that, by creating the ‘right climate’, takes care that the generally accepted deci-
sion is adopted as a premise of one’s own behaviour (ibid., 31ff.). Combining 
both views in this paper, legitimacy communication denotes the communicative 
skill of structuring the expectations of actors in such a way that the electricity 
exchange is perceived as being accepted in the framework of certain normative 
tolerance limits. 
The reason that the exchange-based electricity trade required legitimacy 
communication is not least explained by the fact that at the time of the founda-
tions of the energy exchanges they were the first of their kind in Germany.1 The 
electricity exchange is not a German invention. When the idea of establishing 
such market places was discussed in Germany for the first time, energy ex-
changes had long been in existence in other regions of the world.2 The propo-
nents of energy exchanges had to win support for this kind of trade against the 
backdrop that the wholesale market for electricity operated extremely well in 
Germany. Market players had been and still are operating on the OTC market;3 
                                                             
1  As previously Smith suggested, legitimacy has a particular importance for auctions (1990, 
80 et seq.). And even when it is an auction without face-to-face interaction legitimacy is 
deeply needed for stabilising alliances (cf. Hellmann 2007, 187ff.). 
2  At this time e.g. the Nord Pool (founded 1996), the reformed New Zealand Electricity 
Market (founded 1996), the California Power Exchange (founded 1998) and the APX 
Power UK (founded 2000) were already established. All these power exchanges were vis-
ited by the founding committee of the LPX (cf. BD EEX 2010, para 35, see footnote 8). 
3  Berlinghof, Scholz and Krohs define OTC transactions as follows: “Commodity futures 
traded and concluded outside an exchange are referred to as »Over-the-Counter«- (short: 
OTC) transaction” (2006, 670). 
 204 
but – unlike at the exchange – in a bilateral setting between electricity sellers 
and buyers. 
Looking at the legitimacy communication of the exchanges, the paper asks 
who are the senders and who the audiences. On the part of the senders, what 
interests us in the run-up to the formation of the exchange is the commitment of 
its founders, an aspect that has been studied by Donald MacKenzie and Yuval 
Millo (2003) in their case study on the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
(CBOE), whose founding fathers committed themselves personally to gain 
legitimacy for the CBOE. After the foundation of the exchange, I assume the 
organiser’s perspective of the exchange as sender and follow the argument 
advanced by Dirk Baecker (1999), according to which exchanges can be under-
stood as a hybrid of organisation and market. The relevant institutional entre-
preneur is the strategically operating corporate management of the exchange as 
organisation which, endowed with the required resources, carries out legiti-
macy work for the market end of the exchange (cf. DiMaggio 1988). 
Despite all efforts, the actor trying to acquire legitimacy remains dependent 
upon the relative audience, the addressee of the legitimacy communication, 
because legitimacy is “a relationship with an audience rather than being a 
possession of the organization” (Suchman 1995, 594). The proponents of elec-
tricity exchanges are faced with the question of identifying relevant reference 
groups, for instance potential market participants, and adapting their legitimacy 
strategy to possibly conflicting expectations of different reference groups (cf. 
Walgenbach and Meyer 2008, 65-67; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Brunsson 1989).  
The following section starts with looking at the general conditions of the 
electricity market for setting up and establishing exchange-based trading (part 
1). This will be followed by a discussion of the legitimacy strategies (part 2) 
based on Suchman’s differentiation of gaining, maintaining and repairing le-
gitimacy. Focussing on the first phase of legitimacy building, which falls into a 
period of heightened debate on energy politics, I work out seven legitimacy 
strategies: (1) legitimacy qua function, (2) legitimacy import from a well-
established exchange and the early involvement of relevant actors, (3) legiti-
macy import by copying an established market concept, (4) merger of equals to 
increase market liquidity, (5) legitimacy by approval procedures and state 
supervision, (6) satisfaction of transparency needs and, finally, (7) legitimacy 
by acquisition and training of market participants. 
Answering the question, in which way the electricity exchanges gain legiti-
macy, empirical data has been obtained from the technical literature throughout 
the energy industry, documents of EEX and expert interviews with actors in the 
electricity industry.4 
                                                             
4  The interviews were conducted in the period from February to August 2010 as part of the 
current doctoral research project with the working title “Strommarkt und Strombörse – Eine 
wirtschaftssoziologisch-empirische Analyse der börslichen Strompreisbildung und ihrer 
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1. Framework Conditions for  
Exchange-based Electricity Trading 
Before we come to the foundation of the energy exchanges, we need to take a 
look at the liberalisation of the electricity market as an important precondition 
for subsequent developments. As early as at the beginning of the 1990s, the EU 
Commission had made first attempts to liberalise the electricity markets in 
Europe. A fundamental paradigm shift away from the “natural”, local monopo-
lies towards free competition among European energy suppliers occurred in 
1998. 
The efforts at providing free access to the electricity market both on the side 
of the suppliers and that of the consumers were backed from all sides also in 
Germany. The final report of the Deregulation Committee – set up by the Ger-
man government – from 1991 concluded that (1) efficiency reserves would be 
tapped if the local and regional supply territories were abolished, (2) the prices 
for electricity in Germany were too high in comparison with those in the 
neighbour states, (3) power plants could produce at lower costs if they were not 
bound to restrictions in their sales territories and (4) prices were too high, as 
the high cash flow of the energy supply companies indicated (Bontrup and 
Marquardt 2010, 24f.). 
In addition to improved service, the proponents of the liberalisation of the 
electricity market hoped that electricity prices would drop due to more inten-
sive competition and productivity would go up while investments would drop 
at the same time. Despite the lack of clear empirical data, the hope was that the 
liberalisation of the market would actually ensure the success that had been 
envisaged (Brückmann 2004, 63-64). 
The target of the liberalisation of the electricity market as a large European 
project was “to establish the framework conditions for competition and free 
trade in line-bound energies” (Konstantin 2009, 41). A liberalised market 
exists if the following five criteria are met: (1) every electricity consumer is 
free to choose their electricity supplier, (2) the electricity suppliers have sepa-
rated the electricity generation, transmission, distribution and sale/trade in 
terms of organisation, accounting and, as far as possible, also under ownership 
regulations, (3) network access is non-discriminatory in the sense that the net-
                                                                                                                                
Folgen für den deutschen Strommarkt” (Electricity market and electricity exchange – an 
empirical economic sociological analysis of the exchange-based price building and its con-
sequences for the German electricity market). The interviews were conducted as guided 
expert interviews (Liebhold and Trinczek 2000; Bogner and Menz 2005; Flick 2006, 15ff.). 
The interviews were organised to obtain the highest possible gain of scientific knowledge 
about inductive-deductive interaction (Witzel 2000). Following Meuser and Nagel, the cho-
sen interviewees were understood to be experts in the way that they are office holders 
within an organisational or institutional context and as such represent specific problem so-
lutions and decision structures (Meuser and Nagel 2005, 74). 
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work operators grant every network user free access to the network on the same 
terms and conditions they grant to their own customers, (4) an independent 
regulatory body exists which, for example, can take action against anticompeti-
tive practices and infringements by market participants, (5) an independent 
system operator ensures the smooth operation of the network (ibid., 41ff.). (In 
Germany, the four transmission system operators are responsible for running 
the networks.) 
The pace and scope of liberalisation were quite different in the European 
member states (cf. Bontrup and Marquadt 2010, 30). Below, we will focus on 
the German case. Formally, the European electricity internal market directive 
(1996), its translation into the German energy market law (1998), the amend-
ment of that law (2005) and the third internal market package (2009) played an 
important part in Germany (ibid., 13-74). 
A specific feature of the liberalisation of the German electricity market is 
the restraint exercised by the state. Although Germany belongs with Great 
Britain and Finland to the first countries which realised the liberalization for 
power consumers, Germany and also Luxembourg were the only exceptions 
within the European Union not to set up an own regulatory authority (ibid., 30). 
These two countries counted on the self-regulation of the market. This was 
implemented in the form of an association agreement to which a union of key-
account customers (“Verband der industriellen Energie- und Kraftwirtschaft”, 
short: VIK) had also been instrumental. As a managing director and electricity 
market expert of VIK states:  
This is an absolute peculiarity. At the time of the first European internal mar-
ket directive, you can say Germany afforded this option. Germany had been 
very, very persistent and said that we have 900 electricity network operators in 
Germany. This alone will set the stage for competition, so we do not need ex-
tra regulation on top of that. This was why it was included in the first internal 
market directive. But this had already been met with very, very much sceptic-
ism from all other corners, one must say, and then, it was 1996 and the second 
internal market law was in 2003. At that time, the special regulation was de-
leted from the law and they said it had been tried but had failed. This only 
creates friction with everything else that’s going on in Europe and the regula-
tory body was made obligatory in 2003 and this was adopted in Germany in 
2005. (VIK 20105, para 28). 
Yielding to pressure from the European Commission, the “Bundesnetzagentur” 
was set up as a regulatory authority in 2005 (Konstantin 2009, 42). In contrast 
to this, Germany was not lagging behind in terms of opening the market to 
industrial clients and domestic customers. Together with Finland (1997) and 
the UK (also in 1998), it was one of the first countries within the EU to act. 
                                                             
5  VIK 2010: Interview with a managing director and an electricity market expert of VIK on 
31st January, 2010 in Essen. 
 207 
Irrespective of direct control by the government, the go-ahead for competition 
came early in Germany. 
At about the same time, it was suggested in Germany that organised market-
places were a concomitant phenomenon of liberalised markets and that the 
opportunity of establishing such a marketplace should be seized. By the exam-
ple of Saxony, this did not happen with a direct focus on exchanges but “rather 
along the way”, when dealing with the question of how the EU internal market 
directive of 1998 should be translated into national law. A former business-
developer of the EEX explains: 
In principle, it was triggered by the Saxon economics ministry, and the 
framework was because the energy law had been liberalised in 1998 and under 
a legal comparison they deal, because it may be a law requiring approval (by 
the federal states), the federal states also deal with the bills, with the process 
and, within this sort of analysis, they simply made some legal comparisons, 
said how are we going to handle this in future, how do other countries handle 
this and as a result of this comparison they actually found that, of course, there 
always were electricity exchanges in other countries. Well, and then they 
started asking themselves if we follow the example of other countries in libe-
ralising the market, then an electricity exchange will be established here and it 
was thanks to the traditionally good relations between the state government 
and the then state bank that this information was carried into the state bank.’ 
(BD-EEX 20106, para 27.) 
Ideas like that one were tabled in many places. In addition to the project in 
Leipzig, concepts for electricity exchanges were being advanced at the “Waren-
terminbörse Hannover”, the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, the “Rheinisch-
Westfälische Börse” in Düsseldorf and in Berlin (Cieslarczyk and Pilgram 
2006, 634; BD-EEX 2010, para 37). And even if the underlying idea of liber-
alisation had been to encourage competition, the Federal Ministry of Econom-
ics tried to avoid the emergence of several electricity exchanges in Germany 
that would compete with each other for market liquidity. Consequently, the 
ministry appointed a panel of experts that was to come up with a recommenda-
tion. On June 10th, 1999, the “beauty contest” of the German electricity ex-
change projects was held in Bonn and led to the expected result, as the expert 
panel favoured the GEX (German Energy Exchange, later renamed European 
Energy Exchange, Frankfurt) project (Cieslarczyk and Pilgram 2006, 635). 
With the recommendation for Frankfurt, and with the exchange at Leipzig, 
the later LPX, being underway and willing to “let competition decide” (ibid., 
635), all other projects were stopped. Even if GEX had come off as the winner 
of the contest, the decision recommended by the expert panel was not binding. 
Like with the music casting shows on television, those who drop out of the race 
may still be in for a good career. Even if the winner of the show often has a 
                                                             
6  BD-EEX 2010: Telephone interview with an ex-business developer of the EEX on 30th 
April, 2010. 
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financial advantage when entering the show business, such financial benefits 
do not apply to our example. As will be seen later, the case of the LPX also 
shows that disregard for the vote of the “jury” may also benefit a contestant. 
The next step for both exchange projects was to turn concepts into practice. 
To this end, the two projects required legitimacy in multifarious ways.  
2. Gaining Legitimacy for the EEX 
The proponents of the two energy exchanges employed several strategies to 
gain legitimacy for their projects. We will describe these strategies in detail in 
this section (see figure 1). 
Figure 1: Legitimacy strategies 
 
2.1 Legitimacy Qua Function 
From a neoinstitutional perspective, an organisation is gaining legitimacy pri-
marily in that it is ascribed a social function (cf. Walgenbach and Meyer 2008, 
65-66). Now, the exchange, a hybrid, has an organisation and a market side so 
that in formal theory the direct application of this organisation sociological 
thesis is afflicted with certain obstacles. In addition to this, it primarily seems 
to be the market side that gives the exchange a basic legitimacy of function. 
According to Konstantin (2009, 44), “(a) major task of an electricity exchange 
is to provide all market participants – on equal terms – with a transparent, 
financially and technically secure market place for trade with energy products.” 
For the constitution of a legitimate market place, however, the organisation 
side of an exchange is an absolute necessity, as Baecker (1999) shows, The 
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an exchange. From the point of view of market actors the organisational struc-
ture remains a necessary attendant symptom of an organised market place 
which the liberalised electricity market needs so badly, as a managing director 
of VIK states: 
We have always been in favour of a liberalised market. A liberalised market 
needs an electricity exchange (...). Whether, considering our customers, the 
result is a positive one, whether the thing with the liberalisation went off well 
or whether it could not have been handled in another or a better way or so, this 
is a completely different matter. But when you decide in favour of liberalisa-
tion, you need an electricity exchange. Or you need a liquid wholesale market. 
This is most important. And to have an exchange in such a wholesale market 
is certainly a good thing, because the exchange is subject to some kind of con-
trol. Whether this is the right thing, this inspection at the moment and whether 
everything is going the way it should, is again another step or another ques-
tion. In the first line, for us it means that there is such an exchange, simply as 
a necessary element of the way we are going and on which we are moving 
forward. (VIK 2010, para 58.) 
In addition to the direct actors in the electricity market, actors from the field of 
science also second the demand for setting up an exchange, as Ockenfels et al., 
state in a look back: “No liberalised electricity market can do without a multi-
lateral trading platform.” (2008, 60). 
In addition to the – generally – legitimate demand for an electricity ex-
change for the liberalised market there are different possibilities for the organi-
sation of such a trading platform: 
But the organisation around such a trading platform is different among the 
electricity markets. All European electricity markets are based on what is 
called the exchange model which is characterised by voluntary exchange deal-
ing and decentralised market organisation and decision-making. (ibid., 60). 
The setting up and operation of an electricity exchange is legitimate alone for 
the reason that politics, industry and science are unanimous in the demand for 
it. Legitimacy qua function is not so much a legitimacy strategy in a narrow 
sense as an advance of legitimacy based on the function of the exchange.  
However, Ockenfels et al. point out that such exchanges can take on very 
different organisational forms, so it seems that every such exchange structure is 
in need of legitimacy for itself. This raises the question of how the different 
exchange projects were endowed with legitimacy. 
2.2 GEX/EEX Frankfurt: XETRA, What Else? 
Legitimacy was gained by a parallel process on two levels. Both projects were 
faced with the task of involving relevant actors. This, in turn, required the 
submission of a convincing concept. Let us look first at the concept of the 
Frankfurt exchange (for the following see Cieslarczyk and Pilgram 2006, 
634f.). At the time after the “beauty contest”, the Frankfurt project focused on 
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winning more shareholders and tried to adapt to the different requirements of 
market actors regarding products and ways of trading. To gain investors’ ap-
proval, the project employed its connections with the renowned Frankfurt 
Stock Exchange and its global XETRA system7. The German Stock Exchange 
Group in turn signalled that it would be able to implement an electricity ex-
change and thereby raised the acceptance of potential traders. 
This legitimacy import from the German Stock Exchange to back the elec-
tricity exchange project might have been one of the reasons why the panel of 
experts rated GEX as the most promising energy exchange project, despite the 
fact that the concept did not provide for development along the line of the 
Scandinavian electricity exchange Nord Pool that was already enjoying interna-
tional acceptance and still met with broad encouragement. The deviation from 
the successful Nord Pool model referred to the sequence of setting up the spot 
and the futures markets.8 Whereas the exchange pioneer Nord Pool favoured a 
spot market at first, to which the futures market was added after sufficient 
liquidity had developed, the Frankfurt project intended to start with an electric-
ity futures market and let a spot market follow. Only after the contest and after 
putting the association agreement II into effect on December 19th, 1999, 
Frankfurt also decided to go ahead with a spot market. 
Thus, the interaction between the exchange and potential market partici-
pants, such as power supply companies, energy traders, portfolio managers, 
banks and key-account customers, occurred already in the run-up to the actual 
trading activities, i.e., during the development of the trading concept. From the 
angle of the market participants, it can be assumed that they willingly seized 
the opportunity of gaining influence over the market concept on the basis of 
which they would be acting later. Even if market participants are not actively 
involved in the development of product concepts, at least their symbolic in-
volvement remains by which the exchange can largely predetermine the expec-
tations which market participants have of the trading processes. Legitimate 
objections on the part of the market participants are hardly possible once the 
exchange has started working because there was sufficient room for participa-
tion. Hence, by involving the market participants, the exchange predetermines 
its environment and in this way creates conformity. 
2.3 LPX Leipzig: With Kisses from Nord Pool 
While the German Stock Exchange in Frankfurt replicated its own market 
model, taking advantage of an established infrastructure and adapting it to the 
                                                             
7  XETRA is an electronic trading system of Deutsche Börse Group (Deutsche Börse Group 
2011). 
8  On the EEX spot market traders can buy and sell electricity products for the next day (EEX 
2008, 4-6). On the EEX futures market traders can buy and sell qualified options and fu-
tures (EEX 2008, 7ff.).  
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specifics of the electricity market, the exchange in Leipzig could not rely on 
local know-how. However, legitimacy was imported there as well. In a first 
step, the proponents of the Leipzig project visited established energy exchanges 
and compared the different market concepts with each other. As the former 
business developer of the EEX states, they identified that the exchanges they 
looked at actually rested on the same principles as the Scandinavian Nord Pool 
exchange:  
Now, after the state bank had been awarded the audit order, we started running 
and said, well, we will just go and see how electricity exchanges in other 
countries look like and then people went to New Zealand because there was a 
fairly well-known electricity exchange there at that time, to California to the 
then Calpex, but also to Britain to have a look at the UK Pool, or to Oslo to 
get an impression of the Scandinavian electricity exchange Nord Pool. And, 
actually, they came back with the idea that all of them were working on the 
same blueprint, those electricity exchanges which, in principle, were follow-
ing the line of the Scandinavian electricity exchange (BD-EEX 2010, para 34). 
Furthermore, the Leipzig project did not only adopt the market model of the 
Scandinavian electricity exchange, but also won Nord Pool, that was interested 
in expansion, as an investor. Surely, looking at the high level of agreement, the 
exchange procedures, say, of the New Zealand exchange model could also have 
been adopted. But the Scandinavian model was chosen, for one, because of its 
high level of acceptance and, for another, because this way an influential actor 
was won as partner, which significantly raised the legitimacy of the LPX. The 
decision criterion in this case is not only who offered the best technical model, 
but who provided an ideal template in terms of legitimacy. 
2.4 The New EEX: A ‘Merger of Equals’ 
In 2002 the EEX Frankfurt merged with the LPX Leipzig to form the new 
electricity exchange EEX Leipzig.9 As the former EEX employee sees it, be-
fore the merger, LPX Leipzig had been a leading spot market whereas EEX 
Frankfurt dominated the futures market. Consequently, the market participants 
had to go about their business in two different market places which, according 
to the ex-business developer, was a cause of complaints among market partici-
pants: 
And then there was that pressure from the market that they were saying, won-
derful, I like the spot market in Leipzig very much, this is the way we want it, 
but then we do not want a plurality of exchanges with two different systems, 
i.e., the market partners exerted pressure on the exchanges and said, well, see 
that you merge, also to avoid, in the final analysis, that any foreign exchange 
                                                             
9  The EEX Leipzig also organizes CO2 Emissions trading (since 2005; cf. Engels 2001; 
Engels 2006; Knoll and Huth 2008), trading of coal products (since 2006) and natural gas 
products (since 2007).  
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comes and gets the better of you. In other words, the pressure actually came 
from the market partners, and then they sat down and discussed how can such 
a merger of equals be handled? (BD-EEX 2010, para 47.) 
As of the media-fuelled competition between the two exchanges failed to pro-
duce a clear winner, Frankfurt and Leipzig had fought for trade, with the effect 
that the turnover of both exchanges remained low. This in turn limited their 
attractiveness for market participants, as a key-account manager of a power 
supply company observes: “At the beginning, bankers tended to smile a little 
on the exchange because volumes were extremely low in Frankfurt. They said 
what do they want with these peanuts.” (KAM-EVU 201010, para 101.) 
An organised trading place is taken seriously only if it has sufficient liquid-
ity. According to Konstantin, liquidity is the inalienable precondition for a 
successful exchange. Liquidity is a result of high sales volumes and a large 
number of market participants (2009, 44; cf. Borchert et al. 2006, 10).  
The continuing battle between LPX and EEX prevented a bundling of li-
quidity and market participants in a single market place. The merger overcame 
this drawback and ended a race in which both contestants declared themselves 
to be “winners”. In this way, both opponents saved their faces. None was offi-
cially blamed to be the loser in the competition. The merger was styled as a 
“merger of equals” to underline the equal status of the two formerly separate 
exchanges. The headquarters of the new exchange was set up in Leipzig, the 
name taken from Frankfurt, and to this date the servers in Frankfurt have also 
been used. 
The disadvantage of the ostentatious equality of treatment of two winners is 
also reflected in the parallel operation of the spot trading system. For example, 
Frankfurt and Leipzig agreed to continue running the two former spot trading 
systems after the merger to EEX. But this decision was not approved by the 
market participants. Only when, in 2003, the change in the spot market system 
to the Xetra platform was announced, did the synergy immanent in any merger 
take effect for the exchange (cf. Cieslarczyk and Pilgram 2006, 637). Here 
again, the management of the new exchange responded to the wishes of the 
market participants in order to avoid loss of legitimacy.  
2.5 Legitimacy by Approval Procedures and State Supervision 
In addition to the modelling of the market, the exchange as an organisation is 
critical in view of its legitimacy. It should be noted here that from a legal point 
of view the EEX AG is the vehicle of the exchange under private law. The term 
EEX, on the other hand, stands for the exchange per se and as such for the 
                                                             
10  KAM-EVU 2010: Interview with a key-account manager of a power supply company on 
10th February, 2010 in Essen. 
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market place for the trade in energy products (cf. Cieslarczyk and Pilgram 
2006, 638). 
Exchanges in Germany are subject to an approval requirement and only the 
official approval of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, 
“Börsenaufsichtsbehörde”) enables and obliges the carrier of an exchange to set 
up and operate the exchange. At the same time, the approval is the constitutive 
legal act for the formation of the exchange as public agency (ibid., 637-638). 
This legal procedure provides the exchange with further legitimacy (cf. 
Luhmann 1983). 
In fact, the exchange does not only consist of the EEX as trading platform 
and the EEX AG as carrier under private law, but also of a bundle of other 
organisations. Before the potential market participants can gather their own 
experience of exchange-based trading, they come to know the EEX as organi-
sation or rather a whole bundle of organisations with their assigned functions, 
under a comprehensive approval procedure. For example, if an organisation 
wants to participate in the EEX’s spot market, it needs to apply for an appro-
priate trading licence with the subsidiaries EPEX Spot SE and Powernext SA. 
Before a licence is issued, the market applicant also requires the acceptance by 
the European Commodity Clearing AG, the organisation responsible for the 
clearing business of the exchange (EEX 2009a, 2009b). 
The formation of subsidiaries for dealing with specific issues is not new to 
the energy trade and can be observed in many industrial organisations. How-
ever, even if the formation of an abundant number of subsidiaries of a purely 
private industrial organisation and corporate links among subsidiaries and the 
parent may well be the cause also for negative connotation. In the case of an 
exchange, any and all reservations that remain despite the approval procedure 
are eliminated by the existence of several control bodies. A case in point is the 
formation of a trading surveillance office. The surveillance focuses the organi-
sation of the exchange, the market places and the trade flows (cf. Cieslarczyk 
and Pilgram 2006, 638). 
This surveillance of trade internal to the exchange, on the other hand, is tied 
up with external bodies such as the “Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistung-
saufsicht” (better known as ‘BaFin’, responsible for the surveillance of finan-
cial services) or the Saxon State Ministry for Economic Affairs as the responsi-
ble SEC. For example, the SEC exercises the legal supervision as well as the 
market and trading supervision over exchange-based trading and the trading 
participants (Cieslarczyk and Pilgram 2006, 639-640; EEX 2007).  
A document published by the EEX in 2007 states: “There is no other energy 
exchange surveilled more closely in Europe” (EEX 2007, 4). The preconditions 
for the approval and operation of an exchange are not simply understood as an 
obstacle created by the legal administration but used as a legitimacy-gaining 
means in relation to the outside world.  
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2.6 Demand for Transparency 
The functional characterisation of the electricity exchange contains one of the 
key requirements of an organised market place: transparency of exchange deal-
ings. The demand for transparency relates to transparency of prices, products, 
volumes and mechanisms of pricing, as various experts stated (cf. PM 201011, 
paras 25, 171; VIK 2010, para 56; KAM-EVU 2010, para 175). 
Transparency should not merely be regarded as an end in itself for the ex-
change. It is primarily a feature that makes the exchange different from the 
OTC market. Electricity has at all times been traded among energy supply 
companies and wholesale firms, irrespective of any electricity exchange. How-
ever, that trade is often said to lack transparency even if appropriate market 
platforms today rely increasingly on the transparent nature of the trading trans-
actions. Due to the low level of standardisation and possibly the partners’ own 
economic interest, details of volumes traded and prices paid are not thrown 
open either unconditionally or fully which, among other reasons, may be due to 
the competition among different suppliers (PM 2010, para 171). 
As we have seen, legitimacy is always related to a relevant reference group, 
a legitimacy maker. The interesting question is whose transparency aims 
should systematically be satisfied. No doubt, transparency is important for the 
market participants to minimise risks and thereby transaction costs. The point, 
however, is, that experts in energy trade have at all times been able to do busi-
ness in a market that seemed non-transparent to outsiders. The question there-
fore is whether transparency has not been created for actors with no involve-
ment in the trade. This assumption is confirmed by the former business 
developer of the EEX: 
And, this may be the point, but I do not believe that this was essential because 
those who were in the markets did know the prices and OTC prices [unintel-
ligible] are also known today and nothing is unknown. It may not be known to 
one or the other politician but, of course, it is transparent to those in the mar-
kets. So this is a poor point to make, it is rather one of those economic ap-
proaches that you say transparency cuts transaction costs. (BD-EEX 2010, pa-
ra 71.) 
In addition to politics, consumer protectors are potential addressees in matters 
of transparency: “Any consumer protector can open the EEX site and can, and 
then will know the wholesale price. You don’t need a broker platform and no 
informants and so on.” (PM 2010, para 169.) 
Whereas the creation of market transparency is regarded as the focal pur-
pose of an electricity exchange, those interviewed saw this matter also criti-
cally. In the final analysis, the exchange was a profit-oriented organisation for 
                                                             
11  PM 2010: Telephone interview with the CEO of a portfolio management company on 13th 
August, 2010. 
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which transparency is a point advanced as a means to the end of maximising 
profit. The point is that market transparency could also be achieved by ways 
other than the formation of an exchange: 
Yes, but you do not set up an electricity exchange for this purpose. An elec-
tricity exchange is also a commercial enterprise whose purpose is that of earn-
ing money. It was formed, as I said, an exchange is also set up under a com-
mercial aspect and not only to offer transparency in the market. This could 
simply be done by a directive, that all prices have to be published somewhere 
or what do I know. (PM 2010, para 177.) 
But the idea of the exchange as a commercial enterprise is also doubted by 
some, “because in many cases exchanges simply are not real commercial en-
terprises” (BD-EEX 2010, para 41). At the same time, the lucrative aspects of 
exchange dealings are considered, here with respect to the financial position of 
the regional states in East Germany: 
You simply had to deal with the issue and in doing so it was actually found 
that an electricity exchange can also be very lucrative. And again it is due, 
well, how should I say, due to the economic necessity, in the eastern German 
states, in particular, you have to take a somewhat more innovative approach 
and say actually we should open new businesses because if we remained in the 
available fields we would only be involved in predatory competition. And be-
cause an electricity exchange has not been discussed anywhere in Germany 
before, it was clear that if you took to it then you are really in a competition-
free market but, in particular, you are not in a conventional crowding-out situ-
ation that is otherwise the case with industrial policy (BD-EEX 2010, para 
31). 
The communication of the transparency of an exchange, in addition to serving 
the need for reducing the cost of transactions of the market participants, most 
of all aims at satisfying the claims of observers who are not involved in the 
trade, such as, for example, politics or consumer protectors. Therefore, the 
communication of transparency also serves as a strategy to gain legitimacy 
among non-trading actors. 
2.7 Selling, Selling, Selling... and Training 
In addition to the actors involved in the early phase of the development of the 
exchange concept, it was important for the EEX to win trading partners 
quickly. The former business developer of the EEX explains how potential 
exchange participants were acquired:  
Success, customers. This is like any other commercial enterprise and this was 
simply the target which we were working on. The main thing both in the pre-
paratory phase and also after the start was to win for the exchange as many 
participants as possible and achieve high trading volumes, a very conventional 
sales task. (…) Well, how you get sales going, you select companies, call 
them, see them, explain to them what you want to do and try to make approval 
procedures as simple and slim as possible, convince them of the concept and, 
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through good relationship management, win them as customers. This is very 
conventional sales, whether you sell shoes or electricity. (BD-EEX 2010, pa-
ras 43, 45.) 
In fact, according to the interview, typical of the starting phase of an electricity 
exchange (or exchanges) is that the members of the exchange organisation are 
required to carry out traditional sales activities to develop among the relevant 
clients the willingness to participate in trading. 
Another possibility of making market participants familiar with the trading 
model is training, a strategy that is employed by the energy exchange. EEX 
does not only run training courses for employees from the trading floors of 
energy supply companies, brokers, key-account buyers, etc. Interested parties 
can also obtain certificates as trader coaches. In this way, the exchange effec-
tively communicates its know-how among the organisations participating in the 
market and thereby strengthens their loyalty to the EEX. One answer to the 
question of how an exchange succeeds in shaping its environment according to 
its claims is that it educates the relevant environment for trading at the ex-
change and thereby develops ties with them (cf. MacKenzie and Millo 2003; 
Granovetter and McGuire 1998). 
Conclusion 
The way in which the EEX electricity exchange and its forerunners in Leipzig 
and Frankfurt were endowed with legitimacy was shown by the seven strate-
gies described above. It has been understood that the electricity exchanges on 
the one hand clearly recognised the expectations of the relevant audiences, such 
as the demand for transparency or liquidity. On the other hand the exchanges 
strengthened their legitimacy by shaping their own environment and forged 
close ties with the market participants through, for instance, training and educa-
tion courses. Both capabilities, the anticipation and the influencing of needs, 
stabilised the exchanges in the electricity market and continue to do so.  
One of the key findings of sociology is that it is mainly the functions of a 
social phenomenon that are officially non-communicable that provide stability 
to it. This article focuses on several strategies in the light of officially non-
communicable functions. It shows how officially communicated arguments, 
such as transparency or copying an existing market model, can also be inter-
preted as legitimacy building strategies. From this point of view, measurements 
that appear to serve an economic rationality in the neo-classical sense were 
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